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Facebook and Dramauthentic Identity: A Post-Goffmanian Model of Identity 
Performance on SNS 
 
D.E. Wittkower 





Early and persistent scholarly concerns with online identity emphasized the ways that 
computer-mediated communications have allowed new, inventive, and creative presentations 
of self, and the lack of connection between online identity and the facts of offline life. After 
the ascendency and following ubiquity of Facebook, we find our online lives transformed. 
We have not only seen online identity reconnected to offline life, but we have seen, through 
the particular structures of social networking sites, our online lives subjected to newfound 
pressures to unify self-presentations from various constitutive communities; pressures 
different from and in some ways greater than those of offline life. After describing identity in 
computer-mediated communications prior to Facebook, and investigating the kinds of 
changed conditions brought about in social networking sites, I put forth a dramauthentic 
model of post-Facebook online identity. This model is comprised of three methods of 
exposure through multiply anchored self-presentation (mixed, agonistic, and lowest-common-
denominator) and four strategies of interaction (spectacular, untidy, distributed, and 
minimized), each of which are employed non-exclusively and at different moments by most 
social networking site users. 






2. Friendship Online and Mutual Self-Interpretation 
3. Self-Presentation Before the Facebook Era 
4. Self-Presentation in the Facebook Era 
5. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Self-Exposure 
6. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Identity-Construction 








In the earlier days of internet studies, the question of self and online identity online centered 
on how digital media allowed for the construction of a self identity untethered from the 
unchosen circumstances of offline life. The earliest and most persistent questions of selfhood 
in digital media have been motivated by and concerned with the optionality of carrying over 
elements of the "RL" self—this problem, and the set of questions having to do with identity, 
community, and personal relationships, can be seen clearly even in the very titles of what 
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have been paradigmatic studies on this era of online life: e.g. Sherry Turkle's The Second 
Self. 
 
In the era of social-networking sites (SNS), digital media present us with a very different and 
in some ways opposite set of concerns. While it is certainly the case that a great deal of pre-
SNS internet use took place using identities intended to reflect the offline self rather than as a 
form of creative identity-play and reimagining of the self1—and certainly the case that a good 
deal of identity-play still takes place today2—the valences of both code and norms have 
become reversed. 
 
The chief concern used to be whether the online self was too untethered, and how the online 
self was or ought to be related to the “real” offline self. Today, instead, the problem is that 
the online self is too tethered, and tethered in ways that reduce user autonomy and identity 
performance. This shift is well-recognized in the prominent contemporary concerns with 
privacy, surveillance, and data mining, but is not fully reflected in current scholarship on 
identity performance online. In this article, I intend to bring together work on this new, 
strongly tethered milieu of online identity performance in order to present a unified model of 
identity performance on SNS. My aim is to present a model which is as general as possible 
while maintaining concrete and detailed grounding in the specific processes and interfaces of 
SNS self-performance. 
 
To highlight the broad changes in online identity performance, from a space generally 
characterized by disconnection and play to a space generally characterized by non-optional 
constraints, we will focus on emblematic kinds of online identity performance, leaving aside 
the admittedly many exceptions. This results in what seems to me an unavoidable openness to 
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the charge of overgeneralization, and I can but request charity in understanding that I mean to 
make general but certainly not universal claims regarding the large-scale shift in the context 
and form of online identity performance which I intend to identify and theorize. 
 
Before beginning the process of articulating the precise nature and origin of this general shift, 
we can attempt to articulate what this shift consists of in its largest-scale view. This attempt 
should be prefaced by the proviso that this preliminary articulation will be, at this point, 
merely suggestive. It does, however, represent the overall view that I hope to establish in a 
more grounded, responsible, and defensible manner by the close of this paper. 
 
As Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman (2012) have expressed this shift,  
 
At first, the Internet and Mobile Revolutions aided this 
segmentation [of context- and community-relative self-
performances]: Email, texting, and mobile calling are usually 
one-to-one media. But the rise of social media has brought 
people back into one network—happily or not. The most 
popular social media such as Facebook have offered limited 
ability—so far—to deal with the subtleties of how people really 
function in different segments of their networks. Rather, the 
sites tend to treat each person’s network as a monolithic entity 
that functions in a let-it-all-hang-out milieu. (p. 16) 
 
As a broad picture, this basic view of how SNS have brought about a return to consolidated 
identity is right, but does not capture the way that a consolidated network actually produces 
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greater limits on contextual self-performance than do offline social networks and groups. It is 
also important to emphasize, as Rainie and Wellman well-recognize in the wider discussions 
of their text, that while the SNS architecture is largely based on a “let-it-all-hang-out milieu,” 
user strategies of managing identity in that milieu are complicated, and certainly not limited 
to merely giving in to the “let-it-all-hang-out” ethos of authenticity built into the SNS 
architecture. Still, their characterization that “Facebook is mostly about groups rather than 
networks” (p. 141) accurately portrays the performance of self on SNS as a return to a former 
form of self-performance rather than as a distinctive new architecture of networked yet 
fully—and ever more fully—tethered self-performance. 
 
How then have the new consolidated networks of SNS not merely returned us to tethered 
identities, but altered and changed these structures of identity performance, whether or not we 
agree with or even acquiesce to the idea that we should be the same “self” in each context? 
To put it in a self-consciously circuitous way, the problematic relationship between the online 
and offline selves has been deproblematicized in a problematic manner. The strikingly 
voluntary construction of self-narrative emblematic of earlier online identity has been re-
attached to less-voluntary and involuntary aspects of offline life, collapsing the wild and 
limitless freedom of identity-construction partially back into the familiar and everyday 
dramaturgical self-construction of multiple self-presentations to various constituent 
communities—but now with an architecturally-imposed need to reconcile those selves with 
one another in a way not required by the architectures of offline life, due to the promiscuous 
intermixing of communities in the information feeds of our Facebooked sociality. 
 
Obviously, this characterization is, at this point, abstract, and dependent on terms and phrases 
which are in need of definition and explanation. In the following, we will engage in a 
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sociologically-informed phenomenology of the structuring of identity performance on SNS—
structuring by both norms and code3—that will allow us, in concrete terms, to explain and 
justify this characterization by constructing a model of self-performance showing these 
changes in architectures, the changing context of identity performance that they create, and 
the strategies which users adopt in reconciling interpersonal autonomy and communal 
connection in this altered online environment. 
 
 
2. Friendship Online and Mutual Self-Interpretation 
 
To get a concrete start on the question of self-identity online in the current technological 
moment, we will begin by looking at a debate from the previous moment. By seeing in which 
ways this debate has become defunct, we can throw the contours of the current moment into 
relief and delineate its outline. To this purpose, we will turn to Adam Briggle’s defense of 
friendship online in his 2008 article “Real Friends: How the Internet can Foster Friendship.” 
 
Briggle is responding to Cocking and Matthews (2000), whose position he summarizes in 
part as that “exclusively online close friendships” are “simply psychologically impossible” 
(Briggle, 2008) because online interactions  
 
[diminish or eliminate] acts of non-voluntary self-disclosure, 
which are necessary for the mutual shaping characteristic of 
close friendships. The Internet is a context dominated by 
voluntary self-disclosure, which enables one to choose and 
construct a highly controlled self-identity. It creates a distorting 
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filter on aspects of ourselves that are normally disclosed to 
friends in offline contexts, thereby short-circuiting the mutual 
interpretation and shaping of identity that contribute to the 
depth and character of close friendships. (p. 73) 
 
Briggle agrees with Cocking and Matthews’ view that a fundamental aspect of the process of 
friendship is reciprocal interpretation, allowing for personal growth and self-discovery, in 
line with the description of a friend as a mirror in the Magna Moralia (Aristotle, 1984). His 
reply to their argument is that computer mediated communication (CMC) presents no 
structural barrier to this process of mutual and reciprocal interpretation, and that therefore 
there is no reason to think that a purely mediated (i.e. online first, online only) relationship 
cannot be a close friendship. Using a compelling example, that of a Union soldier on the front 
of the U.S. Civil War who is pen-pals with a school teacher in Boston, he makes a strong case 
that the distance created by asynchronous communication untethered from face-to-face reality 
actually opens new possibilities for the kind of close friendship which leads to authentic self-
understanding and mutual disclosure. Briggle argues that when we are tied to others, whether 
they are our fellow soldiers, our co-workers, or our poetry club, we must present a certain 
version of ourselves limited by the requirements of maintaining that connection, maintaining 
that community, and serving the goals and shared values which may be central to that 
connection or community. Freed from any involuntary aspects of association and any limits 
on self-presentation, we are able to explore parts of the self that we would otherwise need to 
hide from view—and, further, in the written and asynchronous communication typical of 
most online interaction, we have great opportunities for introspection and careful, deep self-
disclosure. 
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In reading Briggle’s argument today, we see three different images of the self in our 
involvement with different moments of in the development of digital media.  
 
(1.) In the argument from Cocking and Matthews, published fourteen years before the time of 
this writing, we see a view which today seems reactionary and essentialist, responding to new 
technologies of self-performance as suspect and inauthentic and requiring that the self be 
defined in terms of offline interactions. Today, we may wish to push further than Briggle’s 
criticism and ask why the offline self rather than the online self is the exclusive proper 
subject of interpretation and relationship-building. 
 
(2.) In the response from Briggle, published six years before the time of this writing, we see a 
view which today seems quite intuitive and clear: fictionalization and narrative-constructions 
are technologies of the self (Foucault et al., 1988; Dean, 2010, pp. 49–51), and even though 
they can be misused, they are powerful techniques which can certainly support building 
meaningful personal relationships. We might note that Briggle’s view here is well-supported 
by Turkle’s (1995) discussion in Life on the Screen of “taking things at interface value,” in 
which we treat the self established in writing as a legitimate Other with which to build a 
relationship, even if it may not be representative of the entirety of the person performing that 
self. We may even think of the 18th Century practice described by Habermas, “that social 
game in which after dinner everyone withdrew to write letters to one another” (1991, p. 50), 
which places special value in the depth created by the narrativization of less-mediated 
interaction. 
 
(3.) And yet, even though we recognize ourselves in Briggle’s view, we know that it is a 
photograph, not a mirror: we know how to think of ourselves through these features, and it is 
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familiar and comfortable to us, but our features have since changed in ways we are still 
having trouble seeing. We recognize ourselves in his view, and yet know that we have 
changed, and this gives us a good opportunity to see who we are today, and how we have 
changed. Briggle’s snapshot is, I think, ideal for this because it captured our air in Barthes’s 
sense (1980)—his view captured well who we were; I agree fully with his claims, it’s only 
that we have changed since then. Five years’ time is an age in technological matters at 
today’s pace, and we have entered a new era: the era of Facebook. 
 
 
3. Self-Presentation Before the Facebook Era 
 
While Briggle’s argument is concerned with friendship, since the theory of friendship 
employed is focused on reciprocal interpretation, it has clear relevance to questions of 
personal identity. As indicated by his references to Goffman’s Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (1959), a dramaturgical theory of the self is a basic perspective and touchstone, 
and can serve as a cue for understanding the change in personal identity depicted in the 
digitally-mediated and digitally-unmediated selves. To get a view of the self in line with 
Briggle’s argument, we will first consider interactions apart from social networking sites 
(SNS), allowing us to then look separately at the changes brought by SNS. 
 
Within digitally-unmediated self-presentation, we might imagine digitally-unmediated 
interactions taking place (1) within more accidental associations, such as family or hometown 
peers; (2) within communities of common values, such as faith- or politically-based groups; 
(3) within communities of common activity, such as work or volunteer groups; and (4) within 
more fully voluntary associations, including friendships and social groups. In each of these 
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interactions, we present the self differently, and find it inappropriate to designate any 
particular presentation of self as exclusively authentic. Each separate contextual self-
presentation within these communities is limited by the facts of our existence; our particular 
attributes, characteristics, and capabilities. There is also certainly a limit to how divergent 
these selves can be from one another without the threat of being called to account for the 
disparity, should someone from one community encounter us in the context of a different 
community.  
 
This threat is highlighted within constitutive communities, which Sandel (1982) defines as 
people’s associations that are "not a relationship they choose (as in voluntary association) but 
an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity" (p. 
150). While here we will avoid contentious claims about any “true” underlying identity, this 
definition is useful in pointing out why those communities that users themselves consider to 
be constitutive are a greater source of identity threat as compared to communities which are 
in Sandel’s terms instrumental or sentimental—based in utility and self interest, like many 
professional associations for many members; or based in emotional connection independent 
of core values, like the connection people often feel to others from one’s hometown, even 
when they find themselves wanting to distance themselves from the values, beliefs, and way 
of life endemic to their birthplace. 
 
Within digitally-mediated self-presentation—again, excluding social networking sites—these 
aspects of the self can be easily separated. Numerous selves may be presented to numerous 
communities—from the political discussion board, to the parenting webforum, to comments 
from a YouTube account,4 to the pseudonymous blog—with few limits to the presentation of 
self, and little threat that the various selves should be connected unless we ourselves choose 
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to connect them. Without these limits and in the absence of a threat that we may be called to 
account for disparities between these selves, a remarkable capacity for free-play in self-
presentation emerges. When we look at this in commonplace examples, such as the ability to 
engage in political debates which would be viewed as questionable by hometown friends, or 
to be active in a community of faith without disclosing those associations to an 
unsympathetic employer, we see a flourishing of multiple selves which strikes us as a boon 
for self-realization. In these cases, we are likely to see the compartmentalizability of aspects 
of the self as supportive of autonomous identity construction: we are freer to be who we are, 
in some cases, when we can express who we are through fragments rather than facets.5  
 
 
4. Self-Presentation in the Facebook Era 
 
With the ascendency and following ubiquity of Facebook, the circumstances and 
architectures of digitally-mediated self-representation have changed radically. There are 
numerous fairly obvious changes here that deserve enumeration, but the extent of the 
transformation also requires some more in-depth discussion. It is also worth saying from the 
outset that I will be emphasizing Facebook in particular, since it is Facebook that has really 
brought about these changes, at least within the U.S., and in much of the rest of the world as 
well. I do hope, though, that the relevance of much of the following to other SNSs should be 
clear, and I intend to avoid any discussion of issues that are truly particular to Facebook, such 
as its troubling policies centered around harvesting user information to generate saleable 
market analysis for businesses. 
 
We’ll begin with the more obvious changes. 
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4.1 Real names 
 
In digitally-mediated self-presentation prior to Facebook, pseudonymous communication was 
common in many, perhaps most contexts, and use of one’s real and full name was a matter of 
choice. On Facebook, users almost entirely present themselves under real and full names, due 
to Facebook user policies and to the dominant social norm on the site. 
 
4.2 You are Your Own Avatar 
 
The process of building networks through individually request-initiated connections requires 
mutual recognition prior to establishing direct communication or interaction. While some 
context to aid recognition may be supplied through “friends in common” and through primary 
listed network (e.g. employer, school, or location), users have a strong reason to supplement 
name- with face-recognition through use of a recognizable image, and, while deviations are 
frequent and very accepted—as for example, mothers’ relatively frequent use of their child’s 
face as their profile picture—a norm of using a photograph featuring the user’s face is well-
established. By contrast, in other online spaces and in online life prior to SNS, the choice to 
present oneself as oneself, and to use either real name or recognizable image or both as one’s 
avatar, was dictated far more by personal preference and by one’s own aims in engaging with 
a given online community, space, or forum. 
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4.3 Unitary Profile 
 
Only one profile can be created per user-account, a significant departure from our habit of 
presenting ourselves differently in different contexts. Differential access to that self-
presentation may be granted by revealing some profile information to only some groups or 
specified individuals, but it is not possible to have two or more entries in a given category 
(e.g. “Religious Views”) provided to different groups or individuals. Maintaining these 
divisions, however, is cumbersome, as is maintaining multiple user-accounts, another work-
around. 
 
It is certainly true, as several scholars have noted in different ways (Donath and boyd, 2004; 
Papacharissi, 2002a & b; Papacharissi, 2010) that “information communication technologies 
provide individuals with additional tools for the production of more detailed and controlled 
performance of the self” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 69), but even though, in Goffman’s terms, 
the face that is presented, the performances given off, and the setting, props, and front of the 
self are largely within the realm of user control—with the exception of opt-out tagging and 
identity cues given by implication from friends’ posts and comments on a user’s wall—the 
unitary profile places this control within a context where the only options available to choose 
from represent compromises, and sometimes difficult or costly compromises. The unitary 
profile, when combined with the unitary wall, the promiscuous intermixing of audiences (4.6 
below) and the difficulty of managing segregated communicative contexts (4.8 below), 
results in a choice of props and settings for identity performance which are largely voluntarily 
chosen—from what we fill in for the “about” section, how we fill it in, and what we leave 
blank; to what kind of image we project through the profile picture; to what setting and 
associations we give off through our cover photo; to what set of concerns and values we 
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project through the topics of our posts and contents of our comments—and yet this choice of 
props and settings presents unprecedented threats to variously performing divergent identities 
by the fact that these props and settings must serve as the frontstage for self-performance 
before multiple constitutive communities, as well as, often, the setting for the backstage of 
those performances as well, as will be further described below. 
 
4.4 Opt-Out Tagging 
 
The ability of users’ friends to tag them in photos, videos, and notes—these items then 
appearing on the user’s wall until and unless they are specifically deleted—creates a constant 
threat that communities for whom a tailored self-presentation has been created will be 
presented with alternate images of the user, unintentionally, by differing communities. These 
communications, furthermore, may be entirely in line with the self-presentation given to the 
particular communities from which they emerge, resulting in a situation where a friend may 
tag a user in an activity entirely normal within their shared community, but which is 
transgressive to another community of which that user is also a part—and this may be done 
without the knowledge of the user, and without the tagging friend having any intention to 
communicate with the other community, any awareness that that community exists, or any 
idea that there is a disparity in the self-presentations of the user to these communities. What 
appears to one friend as a quotidian and unremarkable documentation of shared activity—
holding hands at the beach, or sitting together at prayer—may appear to another friend of the 
tagged user as a distressing revelation of a questionable secret life. 
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4.5 Obligation to Sign Up and Sign In 
 
Social sacrifices required by non-participation have become significant for many of many 
generations and for many different reasons. In the case of students, Facebook has become a 
substantial center of social life—indeed, it seems a not uncommon practice among high 
school users to friend a large portion of their schoolmates, including those who they may 
view as not just frenemies, but in some cases actual enemies, resulting in an environment 
where self-presentation may be particularly fraught with anxiety and risk. In college students 
and emerging adults, Facebook may be an important tool in social organization, and 
significant social activity may take place on the site itself, leaving the infrequent user or non-
user increasingly disconnected from her own close friends. In older adults, Facebook may 
present an irreplaceable value in providing easy, frequent, and multimedia contact with 
distant friends, distant children, and distant grandchildren. I make no claim that these are the 
primary generational social obligations which strongly encourage participation, and they are 
certainly not the only significant such obligations, but highlight these examples only as 
paradigmatic social forces driving users to sign up and sign in. 
 
4.6 Promiscuous Intermixing of Audiences 
 
While users may choose to target their own communications and limit access to content 
linked, written, or uploaded, this must be done on a case-by-case basis, and is inhibited by 
code (Lessig, 2006), by SNS user norms, and by norms of social interaction. SNS user norms 
are also inhibiting insofar as it seems to be either common knowledge, or at least a common 
assumption, that most SNS users do not target postings most of the time—certainly it can be 
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said at least that such targeting is not transparent to either those included or those excluded, 
and any lacuna in postings received caused by such targeting, even if discovered, may be at 
least as easily explained by Facebook’s inscrutable algorithm determining which posts are 
displayed to which users within the poster’s network.  
 
Our long-established habits of social interaction also do not include regular and purposeful 
targeting of communications independent of the contexts which aid in identifying and 
thinking through our likely audience. Hull et al. (2011) helpfully quote Strater and Lipford’s 
(2008) claim that  
 
while managing identity and privacy is a continuously 
negotiated process in face-to-face interaction, online 
interactions make the case-by-case decision-making process 
difficult. Users rarely interact with each other synchronously. 
Instead, decisions of privacy, what to disclose and how, must 
be made a priori and explicitly. (Strater and Lipford, 2008, p. 
111) 
 
In addition to this shift from “ad hoc decisions” to “a set of ex ante rules for determining how 
information should flow in and between contexts” (Hull et al., 2011, p. 294), Hull et al. also 
point out that “the abstraction involved in asynchronous, online social networking encourages 
a gap between a user’s perceived audience and actual audience;” that “although Facebook 
theoretically has a highly granular set of privacy settings, users do not appear to be taking 
advantage of them;” and that the “binarization of social relations into ‘friend’ and ‘not friend’ 
. . . flatten[s] out all the nuances of face-to-face interactions” (p. 294)—all of which, when 
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combined with the unitary profile and wall, tends to result in a context of simultaneous 
performance before multiple audiences, significantly different from both online and offline 
non-SNS contexts of identity performance. 
 
We are unaccustomed to deciding in each interaction who, precisely, we are speaking to 
largely because our physical and social contexts of communication are typically community-
relative—as we’ll see further in section 4.7 below—whether in the location and social 
purpose of face-to-face encounters or in the more specific online locations of blogs, forums, 
e-mail threads, and so forth. Managing these different audiences through use of code—e.g. 
through selecting from different friend networks or circles—requires a constant and explicit 
thinking-through of who we choose to be relative to those groups. And to think through 
managing these self-performances on sensitive matters requires not only the constant thought 
of those groups, but a recalling who precisely is contained within those groups and imagining 
communicating with each of them individually and how they would respond individually. 
The process quickly becomes burdensome, difficult, and constantly subject to missteps, in 
addition to requiring a certain unfriendliness and circumspect mistrust toward one’s network. 
It should not be surprising if few users indeed choose to regularly target communications. For 
these reasons, many of which will be discussed at further length below, for the most part we 
can treat SNS interaction as a broadcast to a variety of different audiences who are 
promiscuously intermixed. 
 
4.7 Loss of Unintentional Architectural Supports for Identity Management 
 
Taken together, these aspects of Facebook involve ever more people in circumstances of 
online self-presentation which are not merely a reversal of the previous distinction between 
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computer-mediated and computer-unmediated communication, but which actually swing the 
pendulum farther than its point of origin, in some aspects at least. We are not merely no 
longer typically communicating on a variety of different sites, on which we create a variety of 
self-presentations, through which we are represented pseudonymously, and which are 
disconnected from and difficult to connect to one another—that is, the speciation in this vast 
and fecund ecosystem of personal identity has not merely been halted—but rather, in 
Facebook, the forces previously existing offline which inhibited self-presentations of a 
greater divergence from material circumstances or from one another have closed in upon us 
online even more than they ever had offline. This has happened not only in the more clear 
ways delineated above, but also, as we’ll see in the following, through the basic but subtle 
way in which digitization can change the meaning and importance of the information it 
represents by both replicating some aspects of pre-digital architectures which are viewed as 
functional, and also failing to replicate or consider the functionality of other pre-digital 
architectures. 
 
Facebook is designed to re-create our offline social networks in its social graph—but while 
Facebook has been quite successful in motivating users to digitally reconstruct those 
connections, Facebook has not digitally reconstructed in code the offline unintentional 
architectural barriers (Lessig, 2006) which we use to navigate between our various 
communities and maintain multiple self-presentations, tethered to those contexts and not 
identical to one another. This includes the creation of what Papacharissi (2010) has well-
described as “architecture[s] of publicly private and privately public spaces” from 
“convergence of technologies . . . convergence of spaces . . . [and] convergence of practices” 
(p. 61)—all of which is intensified and made all the more impactful by the other identity-
tethering factors outlined in the above and following sections. As a result, the integration of 
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various communities in the SNS does not re-create the dynamics of offline self-presentation, 
but instead introduces the demand for a set of self-presentations that can be reconciled with 
one another that is actually more radical than in digitally-unmediated communication, and the 
call to account for disparities between self-presentations is no longer a mere possibility and a 
threat, but is instead a task at hand in most interactions. 
 
To demonstrate this kind of emergent outcome, and the need to consider carefully which 
elements of pre-digital architecture we ought to re-create in code, consider the following 
example used in my course in Computer Ethics. In the United States, those convicted of 
certain sex crimes must register their address with law enforcement, and they may be subject 
to certain requirements, for example, to live a certain distance from schools. Further, the 
registry of sex offenders is a matter of public record, and is searchable by name or by postal 
code. I ask my students to consider the difference between (a.) allowing the information to be 
public, but requiring citizens to personally contact local government in order to access 
records; (b.) allowing anyone to search the database anonymously from their own home, 
including international searches by foreign nationals; and (c.) allowing third-party websites to 
provide a portal to the database which displays results to anonymous geographical searches, 
and locates registered sex offender’s current addresses using Google maps.6 Regardless of my 
students’ beliefs about what kind of information should be accessible and to whom, they find 
it abundantly clear that the mere digitizing of information produces a substantial qualitative 
change in the meaning and effect of public availability of that information. I ask them to 
imagine what it would be like to go to a town or county building, look someone in the eye, 
and request the information. Perhaps no question would be asked regarding their reason for 
accessing the information, perhaps the question would not even be implied in a look given by 
the government employee, but they find even being subject to the gaze of even a quite 
PREPUBLICATION	  DRAFT:	  FORTHCOMING	  2014	  IN	  FIRST	  MONDAY	  
20	  
uninterested other to be a significant barrier to any casual access of these data. The facts of 
time and space are also a source of ontological friction, in Floridi’s terminology (2005)—
even a few minutes’ drive to town hall would be sufficient to ensure that those who access 
the information are very likely to have some sort of meaningful motivation to do so. Offline 
activities are limited by their localization in time and space, and involve the need to 
communicate synchronously and in proximity with others, and these basic facts shape our 
choices, actions, and interactions significantly and in ways we often fail to take note of, and 
for these very reasons—the significance and non-obviousness of the influence of these 
facts—we are likely to find that transferring data of personal interest and concern into digital 
formats may transform presentations of self and other in fundamental and unexpected ways. 
 
In digitally-unmediated life, the mere fact of activities and interactions being located in space 
and time, and, except in unusual circumstances, the mutual visibility and recognizability of 
persons in synchronous spatial proximity, form architectural limitations to access of these 
potentially sensitive personal data. These barriers, furthermore, do not for the most part exist 
due to a purposeful attempt to contextually filter information access, but arise naturally 
through the exigencies of physical reality. You may gain, for example, knowledge of the 
private affairs of a male acquaintance by seeing him in the waiting room of the OB/GYN, but 
this is not because, like an abortion clinic, the building was designed to allow entrants to 
protect their privacy—it is instead that there are few reasons for men to be present in the 
building, and the building, by its nature as a building, limits knowledge of who is there by 
virtue of its being in a particular location, other than that of e.g. the workplace or gym, and by 
virtue of its having walls and doors. 
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By contrast, on Facebook, there exist no barriers of this sort; no architectural limits that 
contextualize data access in a way that supports maintaining separation between self-
performances intended for a specific or limited audience. Digitalization, as Floridi has argued 
(2005), has not enhanced or augmented capacities to gain, retain and transmit information so 
much as it has re-ontologized the infosphere itself. We have options in code to recreate these 
boundaries by sharing with specific groups (or circles in Google+), but, at the time of writing 
at least, these options in code are cumbersome—and, even if they were not cumbersome, they 
would still represent specific choices that must be made at the time of sharing information in 
each and every instance of sharing, whereas in offline life, for example we do not need to 
choose to wait to see our doctor only in her waiting room and not simultaneously also in our 
office, our college roommate’s apartment, and our mother-in-law’s living room. 
 
4.8 Regional Ambivalence   
 
As Papacharissi (2010) notes, 
 
In environments that are both privately public and publicly 
private, the sequential arrangement of backstage and front stage 
is upset. The backstage no longer signals privacy and the front 
stage does not guarantee publicity. SNSs potentially collapse 
front and backstage into a single space, by allowing privately 
intended information to be broadcast to multiple public 
audiences, and delivering publicly produced information to 
private and intimately known audiences. Moreover, the 
individual must assess not one situation, but potentially an 
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infinite number, in which the same self-performance must 
maintain authenticity, coherence, and relevance. (p. 142) 
 
While much of this situation has already been addressed in the above, as for example in the 
promiscuous intermixing of constitutive communities, the co-location of back and front 
regions, noted preliminarily above in consideration of the unitary profile (4.3), calls for 
detailed and separate articulation. 
 
The backstage region of self-performance—defined by Goffman (1959) as “a place, relative 
to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly 
contradicted as a matter of course” (p. 112)—is often defined through physical architectures 
in our offline lives. These back regions may be places where props for frontstage self-
performance are stored—as in Goffman’s examples of the back-office or dressing room—or 
where activities of solitude are engaged in: as he says, “the same women may leave The 
Saturday Evening Post on their living room end table but keep a copy of True Romance (“It’s 
something the cleaning woman must have left around”) concealed in their bedroom.” (p. 42) 
But backstages can certainly also be social spaces as well, as in the hotel kitchen or other 
staff-only work spaces (pp. 114–22), or in hunting lodges and locker rooms (p. 125).  
 
Backstages, though they are spaces from which a frontstage performance is understood as a 
performance, are certainly not spaces free of their own self-performances. The executive’s 
private office (p. 126) is a place where professional decorum may be dropped for more 
informal dealings, and yet the informality performed there may still be a performance; even a 
self-conscious one intended to project relaxation rather than being a felt expression of it (p. 
134). It’s not even the case that the backstage performance should be regarded as more 
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authentic, whatever we may mean by authenticity—“In a sense,” Goffman says of more or 
less consciously ‘playing a role’, “and in so far as this mask represents the conception we 
have formed of ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to—this mask is our truer self, 
the self we would like to be.” (p. 19) 
 
Jurgenson and Rey (2012) write that “most commentators who cite [Goffman] today,” at least 
within the context of social media research, “[overlook] that the front stage and back stage, 
the visible and invisible, are dialectically linked” (p.65), and go on to lament claims that “our 
lives have become all front stage,” (p. 65) or a “middle region” between front and back stages 
(p. 66). One example might be Pearson’s (2009) discussion of the “glass bedroom”: the 
image itself seems to represent a loss of truly backstage spaces, but Pearson’s view is more 
complicated: “Inside the bedroom,” Pearson writes,  
 
private conversations and intimate exchanges occur, each with 
varying awareness of distant friends and strangers moving past 
transparent walls that separate groups from more deliberate and 
constructed ‘outside’ displays. The glass bedroom itself is not 
an entirely private space, nor a true backstage space as 
Goffman articulated, though it takes on elements of both over 
the course of its use. It is a bridge that is partially private and 
public, constructed online through signs and language. 
(Pearson, 2009) 
 
While this view is nuanced and valuable, it does not capture the dialectical relation between 
front and back regions, whereby the front stage exists as a front stage by virtue of its relation 
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to a back stage, and the back stage, for its part, exists as a back stage by virtue of its relation 
to a front stage. 
 
Jurgenson and Rey’s alternate view of the dialectical linkages between front and back stages 
calls upon the image of a burlesque “fan dance” that variously reveals and conceals different 
aspects of the self/selves, and well-captures the complexity of SNS users’ approach to 
privacy and publicity: we do not simply expose or conceal some self or other, but perform 
aspects of self momentarily in a way which is public and yet also establishes withdrawn, 
backroom, and intimate connections, either through performing in different ways at different 
moments, or through “social steganography” (boyd and Marwick, 2011) or other means of 
projecting different messages and identities simultaneously to different audiences (Jurgenson 
and Rey, 2012, pp. 66–67). 
 
But the ambiguity and fluidity of front- and backstages is not new to SNS. Where 
architectures separating front from back regions are not present, we still move quickly into 
and out of backstage moments, as in the sotto voce utterance in a crowded room, and may 
find that, if we walk up to the wrong conversation at a party, that we have entered into a 
backroom conversation in which we feel deeply uncomfortable—or we may be spared this 
awkward circumstance by being confronted instead by a sudden (and also awkward) halting 
of the conversation. In a more general sense, every conversation that ventures the simplest 
step beyond “small talk” becomes a fan dance of this sort, where personal anecdotes and 
statements of views and values occupy ambiguous positions as some mixture of fronting, 
backstage admission, uncomfortable oversharing, purposefully over-intimate pseudo-
backstage posturing intended to strategically generate letting down of fronts on the part of the 
other, etc., etc. We also certainly see these dynamics in non-SNS forms of online 
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communication as well. Webforums, for example, often establish architectures for front- and 
backstage communication—most frequently in the form of “off-topic” boards as distinct from 
the more frontstage “on topic” boards—but discussions in explicitly on-topic spaces often 
enough get sidetracked and hijacked, and even business-like threads “get personal” in sudden 
and unexpected ways. These ambiguous hybrids and sudden shifts in the regions of self-
performance are not unique to SNS, although we do certainly see them there as well. 
 
What is, however, distinctive and novel in SNS is the regional ambivalence of particular 
communications. Due to both the invisibility and variability of the architectures used by other 
users, we do not know when interacting with others whether we are in front or back regions 
(or both simultaneously) in their self-performance, and regularly produce accidental identity 
threats to others. For the most part, we interact with others in a state of unawareness whether 
a given post is visible to their entire network or only parts of it. (It is true that we can gain 
some knowledge of this by looking to see whether a post is public or limited in some way, 
but are not likely to check this for any but the most obviously sensitive communications.) 
Worse yet, numerous posts over time may present to us a view of our friend’s preferred 
performed identity, through accretion and sedimentation of information flows emanating 
from the user—and naturally it is that accumulated identity which we interact with in public 
replies, even though it may be that the identity we see is made up in part of posts directed to a 
more limited group of which we are unknowingly “insiders.” We’ll address each of these 
possibilities in more detail. 
 
A user may manage their identity by choosing to only friend those whose communications 
may be trusted to be in keeping with those representations which will be comfortable for the 
rest of the user’s network—whether this is because all those friended can be assumed to keep 
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everything on the frontstage, or because all those friended are those which can be 
comfortably invited backstage. In either case, it is difficult for their friends to know that this 
has been done. To illustrate a different user-created architecture of identity management, 
consider the following: I have a friend who frequently posts comments and links that clearly 
identify political and (non-) religious orientations likely to be unpopular or even dangerous 
within his line of work. It did not occur to me that these many posts were visible only to a 
selected group of his friends—a fact I was informed of by private message after he removed a 
relevant link I had posted on his wall. I had assumed that his friend list had been curated to 
allow the backstage communication he was engaging me and others in, where in fact 
differential friend lists were being employed to make some of these communications 
frontstage and others backstage. In posting this communication on his wall, I had suddenly 
wandered onstage while continuing a backstage-only dialogue—or, to use a different 
analogy, it is as if we had been speaking candidly of a sensitive matter on the stage as the 
audience filed in, and I suddenly turned on his microphone. The difference, of course, is that I 
didn’t know there was a stage or audience—and how was I to have known in this 
circumstance? A further complication: while the architecture allows him to make some 
utterances in a frontstage region and others backstage, it does not allow me access to the 
same architecture, even now that I know that it is being used. I can’t post to his “in-group”—
only he can—and so I can only respond in a thread, guessing whether it is front- or backstage, 
or I can post on his single and unitary wall, ambivalently both front- and backstage. 
 
Users change these modes of interaction over time as well, producing further identity-
threatening uncertainties. Many users start accounts for personal reasons, and expand them 
over time to ever-more sectors of their lives, resulting in an older network of friends who 
may continue to interact in a backstage manner even as the user network comes to include 
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increasing numbers and an increasing proportion of professional contacts. Things may work 
out the other way as well. Like many academics who joined in the earlier days of Facebook, I 
initially created my account to interact professionally with students and colleagues, 
expanding over time in the other direction. As I’ve gotten married and had children, my 
profile and posts have become increasingly personal and backstage. In another kind of 
example, I have one contact—a graduate student—who systematically defriended her 
professional-only “friends” during a time of great personal stress, in order to convert her 
hybrid public-private/front-backstage network into a purely personal and backstage network 
where she could speak freely about her stress and turmoil, and reach out for emotional 
support in very private and vulnerable ways. I know about this because she mentioned having 
defriended me for this reason in a post which, however, showed up directly in my newsfeed. 
The source of this accidental oversharing is Facebook’s current structure of “followers”: if 
you allow followers, someone, when defriended, is removed from your newsfeed—but you 
are not removed from theirs. From my perspective, her posts had simply become much more 
personal as she entered into a time of great difficulty, and I believed I had been implicitly 
invited to become a source of support and care for her, when in fact she had explicitly 
attempted to remove me from her SNS space as part and parcel of its conversion to a 
backstage region. After I informed her of this oversharing, having seen her mention having 
defriended professors and professional contacts, she did not go on to remove me from her 
followers, and so I now occupy an ambivalent audience to her communications. I am a 
known party to them, and yet have not fully and clearly been invited backstage; perhaps she 
would ideally not rather have me there, but is not concerned enough to do anything about it. 
Perhaps she would be glad to hear words of support and understanding beyond those I spoke 
initially—or perhaps she prefers civil inattention as a response to these backstage 
communications leaking into a frontstage context (Goffman, 2010, pp. 4–5fn.).  
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Many users, instead of using the architectural remedies mentioned above, accept this 
ambivalence knowingly, and simply communicate alternately or simultaneously in front- and 
backstage regions before an undifferentiated audience, counting on the prudence of their 
friends to self-select whether they are insiders or outsiders to a given topic, exhibiting care 
and informality in the one case, and civil inattention in the other. This regional ambivalence 
is characteristic of SNS sites, for, even when there is an attempt to separate out regions, this 




These, then, are the factors active in Facebook which have brought our navigation of identity 
online back from an open ecosystem of identities to the constraints of the dramaturgical self 
characteristic of offline interaction, and beyond it as well: (4.1) Real names, (4.2) You are 
Your Own Avatar, (4.3) Unitary Profile, (4.4) Opt-Out Tagging, (4.5) Obligation to Sign Up 
and Sign In, (4.6) Promiscuous Intermixing of Audiences, (4.7) Loss of Unintentional 
Architectural Supports for Identity Management, and (4.8) Regional Ambivalence. Taken 
together, these form a distinctive SNS version of context collapse, which Michael Wesch 
(2009) defined with regard instead to YouTube, as  
 
an infinite number of contexts collapsing upon one another into 
that single moment of recording. The images, actions, and 
words captured by the lens at any moment can be transported to 
anywhere on the planet and preserved (the performer must 
assume) for all time. The little glass lens becomes the gateway 
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to a black hole sucking all of time and space—virtually all 
possible contexts—in on itself. (p. 23) 
 
In SNS, however, the ‘sucking black hole’ is not the collapse of the context of our action into 
(potentially) all others, but the collapse of the context of our action into numerous but largely 
known or knowable others—all those contexts of our constitutive and non-constitutive 
communities, including our friends and friends-of-friends. In this way, the context collapse 
distinctive of SNS and resultant from the eight factors outlined above has more in common 
with the “drain hole” in the universe that Jean-Paul Sartre (1993) identifies with the 
subjectivity of the Other before us, where “[t]he appearance of the Other in the world 
corresponds . . . to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world 
which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting” (p. 343). In 
Sartre’s more fundamental and existential example, we discover that we have a secret and 
ultimately unknowable aspect, trapped within the subjectivity of the Other—who we are 
cannot be understood in full by ourselves alone, for we are also that aspect of ourselves 
which disappears into the perception of the Other. In SNS, we suffer a context collapse which 
presents to us our simultaneous co-presence among multiple contexts which are, however, all 
our communities; groups of persons with which we more-or-less identify and through which 
we more-or-less conceive of ourselves. This, then, is not the “black hole” of innumerable 
perceptions to which we have no particular connection, but a more specific and threatening 
“sliding” wherein we know ourselves to be simultaneous present in different contexts each of 
which we identify with and have invested in. The distinctive context collapse of SNS is 
Sartrean in that each of the selves created in the subjectivities present within our network are 
meaningfully and pressingly felt as relevant to who we “really” are; a version of ourselves 
which has some bearing on our “true” selves insofar as we have made personal investments 
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and valuations in the perspectives of those persons and communities whose unknowable 
perception and reception our performances disappear into. “Haters gonna hate” does not free 
us from identity threat on Facebook as it does on YouTube, and negative perceptions, stated 
or unstated, have a real bearing on our lives and self-conception, rather than being limited to 
judgments of unconnected others to a self-performance broadcasted in disconnection from 
our constitutive communities and personal relationships. 
 
This modified and intensified return, in our online lives, to the difficulties of managing 
contextual selves native to dramaturgical identity, combined with additional pressures to 
present oneself in a unitary fashion, as if each presentation were clearly and immediately a 
presentation of a singular true self, gives rise to a distinctive variety of selfhood required in 
the era of Facebook. We can call this dramauthentic identity. 
 
 
5. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Self-Exposure 
 
In dramauthentic identity, we must perform selves to constitutive communities not 
variously—as in much of offline life, where within one context one aspect of the self may be 
presented, and within another context, another aspect—but simultaneously. In dramaturgical 
self-presentation, identity is variably anchored, whereas in dramauthentic self-presentation, 
identity is multiply anchored.  
 
I have chosen the term “dramauthentic” not because identity on Facebook must be more 
authentic than the offline, dramaturgical self, but rather because authenticity is an issue for 
self-presentation on SNS in a new and prominent way, due to the factors outlined above, 
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which collectively result in a constant need to perform within multiple contexts as if one has 
only a singular, unitary self, constant through all constitutive communities—which need, 
however, may be met either through an attempt at reconciliation of self-presentations into a 
more-or-less authentic singular performance of self, or through a newly more self-conscious 
attempt at contextual and managed performances of self which have a newly more self-
conscious intention to categorize and select from relationships for differential access to an 
identity beyond and in some way inclusive of those performances.7 
 
It should be emphasized that I do not mean to presume that a unitary and singular 
performance of self is more authentic than variably anchored and contextual self-
performances—but, instead, that I mean to draw out how the perspective placed in code in 
Facebook and to a significant extent in other SNS as well implies this privileging of unitary 
self-performances. It should not be surprising that this is the judgment implied by Facebook’s 
architecture: Mark Zuckerberg is quoted in an interview with David Kirkpatrick (2010) 
saying, “You have one identity . . . The days of you having a different image for your work 
friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end 
pretty quickly . . . Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity” (p. 
199). Personally, I am inclined to say instead that multiple self-presentations allow for more 
authentic exploration and expression of the self, as this allows, in Heidegger’s terms (1962), 
for us to navigate our way through our entanglement in the “They” while maintaining a 
separate interiority with a critical distance from various social selves, allowing for more 
authentic self-development. Those readers who wish to deny the meaningfulness of any 
“authentic” self at all will also disagree with Zuckerberg, and should also see no benefit for 
authenticity in requiring unitary self-presentation. In any case, the use of the term “authentic” 
in describing what will be called here “dramauthentic identity” should not be taken as a 
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claim, implicit or explicit, that an “authentic self” exists, or is either well- or poorly-served by 
requiring a unitary self-presentation. The point is instead merely that authenticity as a social 
norm and as a constant task at hand in communicative practice, structured in new ways in 
code, is a pressing issue for us in the age of SNS more so than in not only our previous online 
lives, but more so than in our previous offline lives as well. 
 
In multiply-anchored self-presentation, multiple aspects of the self must be either (5.1) 
implied to one community without clear presentation to another, (5.2) reconciled by 
presenting some aspects of identity to a community from which we might otherwise prefer to 
hide them, or (5.3) reduced in scope and depth, limiting exposure of aspects of identity which 
do not match with preferred self-presentations within various contexts.  
 
5.1 Mixed exposure  
 
A mixed strategy of exposure is difficult to maintain and takes place under constant threat of 
context collapse, as some members of some of a user’s communities are unlikely to know the 
proper boundaries of self-performance relative to other communities of the user which may 
be present. For example, you might be friends with several public school teachers, but have 
no way of knowing without careful observation of their posting habits (and perhaps their 
deleting of posts) which are more or less prepared for communications which they would not 
wish to have seen by students or students’ parents—whether their wall is public, limited, or 
private; whether they are friends with students, with former students, with students’ parents, 
with former students’ parents, or none of these; or whether they are friends with 
administrators or school board members. This danger, of course, extends far beyond tagging 
someone dancing on the table last Saturday, but can include something as simple as sending 
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along a news story that might be of interest, but which is critical of certain educational 
practices or policies, or a video implying an even mildly risqué sense of humor. Some users 
circumvent the lack of control of self-presentation created by the ability of others to post and 
tag by simply refusing to friend anyone who is not likely to understand the acceptable 
boundaries of such actions, or by refusing to friend anyone who they do not wish to be 
audience to the majority of anticipated third-party sharing. 
 
5.2 Agonistic exposure 
 
The strategy of exposure of unifying self-presentation by a challenging sharing of aspects of 
identity we might usually hide from some communities, we could call an agonistic exposure. 
Paradigmatically, we can consider choosing, under the constraints of loss of control through 
third-party sharing, to “come out” to one’s parents—although numerous other forms of self-
disclosure (faith, politics, etc.) to numerous other communities (work, church, etc.) could be 
used as equally clear and dramatic examples. These paradigmatic examples are representative 
of numerous smaller disclosures which, though perhaps less dramatic, represent 
thoroughgoing ways in which small, contextually-relative interactions targeted to a particular 
audience become directed indiscriminately towards a promiscuously-intermixed assemblage 
of audiences. These disclosures are typically of innocuous information, such as hobbies, 
interests, one’s sense of humor, or daily minutia of home or family life, but for that are not 
without significant social meaning. Each of these disclosures can be a challenge to others; 
they say this is who I am, accept me; or this is the way my life is lived, how does yours 
compare?; or I am a full person beyond your contextual knowledge of me, will you choose to 
involve yourself with me further? When a coworker with whom we have only a formal 
business relationship posts funny cat videos, we must ask whether we choose to make 
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ourselves the audience by responding, and in so doing, bring a new element into that 
relationship. When an acquaintance reaches out for emotional support, we must decide 
whether we think of ourselves as, or are willing to become, among those in his network who 
can be depended upon in difficult times—and whether our “opting in” to that support network 
will be viewed as a welcome deepening of that relationship or as an unwelcome intrusion. 
When a family member posts about politics, we must decide whether our relationship may be 
threatened or deepened by “going there.”  
 
The costs of adopting an agonistic strategy exposure are potential alienation or abandonment, 
but the potential benefits may also be significant. The potential benefits for the user in finding 
that some separation between various self-presentations is unnecessary was clear: 
maintaining such separation requires effort and care, may be psychologically difficult or 
stressful, and may diminish the value and depth of personal relationships. The potential 
benefits for others are perhaps less obvious: by choosing an agonistic exposure which 
embraces the promiscuous intermixing of audiences, recipients of communications are freed 
from the normal constraints placed on relationships, and may choose to pursue connections 
forestalled by the contextual communication which takes place offline and online outside of 
SNS. A professional contact may never have been approached as, for example, a person to 
turn to for casual conversation or discussion of parenting, but agonistic exposure allows 
constant opportunities to allow parties to a relationship to reimagine their relationship and 
explore what it may or may not be able to become. 
 
5.3 Lowest-common-denominator exposure 
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The third strategy of exposure, reducing the scope and depth of our self-presentation on SNS 
to limit exposure of information which may be troubling to some members of some 
communities, we could call lowest-common-denominator exposure. Here, the user may offer 
a sanitized and expurgated self-presentation, in which the threat of mixed exposure and the 
danger of agonistic exposure are avoided at the expense of the decreased ability to use SNS to 
maintain and develop deeper relationships more closely connected to mutual recognition and 
emotional support—“symmetrical esteem,” as Schlesselman-Tarango (2013, p. 7) puts it, 
drawing on Axel Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition (1995). Some users, moving even 
further, respond minimally to the obligation to sign up and sign in, using SNS only as 
necessary to maintain non-SNS-based relationships with those who generate obligations to 
sign up or sign in—for example, accepting friend requests in order to avoid perceived 
impoliteness, but never making friend requests; choosing not to upload a profile picture; or 
accessing the account only when notified of a message or posting, but choosing not to post or 
initiate interactions. 
 
These three strategies of exposure in the context of multiply-anchored self-presentation have 
focused on ways in which aspects of the self may be revealed or hidden from various 
communities. They have, in this way, spoken as if the performance is an attempt at a 
representation of a previously- or elsewhere-formed self, whether that performance is (as in 
agonistic exposure) a performance before constitutive communities, intended to reveal 
information, or (as in lowest-common-denominator exposure) a performance intended to 
conceal information tied to one or more constitutive community, or (as in mixed exposure) a 
performance intended to reveal information differently to different constitutive communities. 
All this speaks of self-presentation of a more-or-less underlying identity, within communities 
rightly regarded as constitutive, as implied by the use of the term “exposure” rather than e.g. 
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“construction.” We should not, however, ignore self-construction of identities which are more 
invented or aspirational than expressive of a more-or-less underlying identity, and self-
construction within communities which are not constitutive so much as they are chosen as 
activities of self-invention and growth or change of self-identification. Surely, though, there 
are no clear boundaries to be found here, for at least three reasons.  
 
First, there is no clear boundary between online and offline identity construction—character 
formation is not an offline-only process and, especially as successive generations get online 
earlier and earlier in life, the self that we expose through online performances cannot be 
assumed to be pre-formed prior to online performances, but is instead formed through on- 
and offline performances. 
 
Second, when we join a community or adopt an identity under an aspirational self-
performance, this process self-reinvention does often enough lead to an internalization of 
self-consciously adopted values, and a transition from aspirational attributes into more 
permanent and unselfconsciously held elements of character. Sometimes we just fake it, but 
sometimes we fake it ‘till we make it.  
 
Third, we are not always well aware of when we are performing a truthful exposure of an 
existing self or facet of ourselves, and when we are performing an aspirational or even fairly 
fictionalized self. Indeed, we may wish to question whether there is any clear self to be found 
outside of various self-performances, to which we could even possibly be “truthful.”  
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For these reasons, we should take care to note that self-performances involve a dialectical 
relation between self-exposure and character formation—each takes place only alongside and 
by means of the other, as Aristotle noted long ago in the Nicomachean Ethics (1984),  
 
This, then, is the case with the excellences [virtues] also; by 
doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we 
become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the 
presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or 
confidence, we become brave or cowardly. . . .Thus, in one 
word, states [of character] arise out of like activities. This is 
why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is 
because the states [of character] correspond to the differences 
between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we 
form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it 
makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference. (p. 
1743: 1103b12–26) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this investigation to consider what role dramauthentic identity plays 
in character formation—the important point to be made here is more simply that we cannot 
easily separate aspirational or even fictitious self-performances from truthful self-
representation, but find instead a complex and dialectical relation to be at work. 
 
The remaining question, then, is how these strategies of self-exposure are used to construct 
self-identities. While remaining agnostic regarding how these identities are related to 
authentic selves or true character—indeed, remaining agnostic regarding how meaningfully 
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such things can be said to exist—we can outline four strategies of identity construction that, 
along with these three strategies of self-exposure, constitute dramauthentic identity. 
 
 
6. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Identity-Construction 
 
We may chart different strategies of identity-construction on two axes, resulting in a way of 
imagining a field of possible modes of interaction falling into four quadrants. On the x-axis, 
we can chart a continuity from (-1, 0) divergent constructions of identity to (1, 0) unitary 
constructions of identity, and, on the y-axis, a continuity from (0, -1) reactive constructions of 
identity to (0, 1) proactive 
constructions of identity. 
Charting on these axes 
results in four quadrants 
which can be characterized 
by their extreme points; I 
will describe them under 
these terms: I. spectacular 
identity (1, 1), II. untidy 
identity (-1, 1), III. 
distributed identity(-1, -1), 




Figure	  1:	  Four forms of dramauthentic identity in quadrants, 
defined using divergent-unitary as x-axis and reactive-
proactive as y-axis.	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These are strategies of interaction which most SNS users move among—this is not meant to 
be a typology of users, but rather a view of different strategies of use that users engage in at 
different moments, although it is certainly true that users may have a more-or-less strong 
tendency towards or away from one or more certain kinds of use. These strategies are shown 
on a field to represent how, while what will be described below are four extremes of 
behavior, interactions exhibit these different strategies not absolutely but to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
 
6.1 I. Spectacular Identity 
 
This is a strategy of interaction which actively seeks to create a spectacle of identity in a 
sense approximating that of Debord’s Society of the Spectacle.8 Here, a unitary identity is 
actively produced as a medium through which the network is intended to interact with the 
user. Spectacular identity is groomed as a representative of the user through judicious choice 
of profile identifications, through kinds of postings and comments, and through those 
included and excluded in friend lists, circles, or on Twitter, follows, influence, and proportion 
of follows to followers. Baroncelli and Freitas (2011) have also drawn a parallel between 
certain sorts of SNS user activities and Debord, wherein they claim that in self-
spectacularization, “personal life becomes a capital to be shared with other people,” and that, 
influenced by celebrity culture (Hedges, 2009), “although most individuals do not attempt to 
become a celebrity, many of them often end up organizing life according to the underlying 
codes of the celebrities’ culture,” seeking recognition through a repackaging of the self as 
unique, talented, and situated within a personal screenplay (Baroncelli and Freitas, 2011) 
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It is this strategy of interaction which Muhr and Pedersen (2010) seem to have in mind when 
characterizing the function of Facebook identity in terms of Žižek’s (1998) idea of 
interpassivity, where the SNS representation of value commitments and fulfilling life 
activities can free the user from actually choosing and committing to values or actually 
finding activities of life meaningful. Similar to the way tourists may use a photograph in 
which an important and culturally weighty landmark may be seen behind them as a 
consumable substitute for the cultural value which might have been obtained by actual 
engagement with that landmark and its history, the Facebook identity can be viewed as a 
location wherein the markers of life in accordance with the user’s self-conception may be 
displayed, displacing the drive for realization of that life in favor of mere acquisition of 
evidence of its realization. But, while this is an important and troubling possibility, I see no 
reason to suppose that the spectacular use of SNS identity-construction as an ambassador of 
the self should preclude also actually striving for or achieving those aspects of identity of 
which it is a spectacle. 
 
Spectacular identity is not necessarily merely a front; it may be a an idealized, aspirational, or 
fictitious self, but may also be a false identity only insofar as any such spectacle of self 
necessarily differs from that of which it is a spectacle. The spectacular self, then, is a 
groomed identity manufactured as a consumable product and as an image preceding and 
conditioning interactions, whether or not it is constructed of veridical representations. 
 
6.2 II. Untidy Identity 
 
This is a strategy of interaction which is proactive in posting, sharing, and demonstrating 
values, commitments, and identity, but does not seek to present a groomed, unitary self-
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image, instead allowing divergent markers of character and identity to coexist. This untidy 
self-presentation—or, perhaps, refusal to present a unitary self—occurs primarily through 
two common sorts of interaction: unedited third-party construction of the self through tagging 
and posting, and personal oversharing through broadcast of communications emerging from 
or proper to a narrower audience. 
 
In third-party self-construction, users are tagged or mentioned in notes, photos, etc. and in 
this way a depiction of the self, sometimes even a false or outdated depiction, is projected 
onto the user. This also occurs through the direct posting of material to the user’s wall, e.g. a 
news story accompanied by “We were just talking about this!” or “Thought you’d be 
interested.” Through these third-party postings, an involuntary construction of self occurs, 
which may be divergent from one or more voluntary self-presentations either online or 
offline. 
 
In addition to this involuntary self-construction, users will not infrequently post generally 
something proper to a more specific audience. This oversharing may be done agonistically, 
where there is a challenge to other audiences to choose to ignore, participate, or tolerate the 
communication; accidentally, where the user would prefer to have removed several friends 
from access but did not have the potential for oversharing in mind; apathetically, where the 
user neither intends to challenge nor forgets to target, but simply can’t be bothered to 
maintain and groom self-presentation to differing audiences; invitingly, where the 
communication is of direct relevance to a few, but the user is open to the possibility that 
others may have an unforeseen interest or concern in the topic or information; or self-
importantly, where the user overestimates, sometimes markedly, the number of recipients 
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who will find interest in the communication, for example, of where they are currently waiting 
in line, or how they feel about that week’s celebrity scandal. 
 
Through involuntary third-party projection of identity and various forms of oversharing, an 
untidy identity may emerge, in which identity on SNS appears as an overlapping and 
kaleidoscopic pastiche of different concerns, interests, contexts, communities, and moods. A 
unitary identity is not constructed, as in spectacular identity, but the self is instead projected 
backwards as some center point or line of contiguity connecting this variety of appearances. 
 
6.3 III. Distributed Identity 
 
This strategy of interaction is reactive rather than proactive, choosing to respond to the 
content of others rather than creating or posting content. This allows the user to maintain 
divergent self-presentations while minimizing untidiness, due to the lack of connections 
between friends to whom the user might present herself differentially.  
 
As noted previously, in offline communications, the mundane conditions of space and time 
provide architectures that determine audiences contextually, limiting the threat that the actor 
will be called to account for disparities between self-presentations. By posting in response to 
the posts of others, or by posting on the walls of others—rather than initiating interactions 
through posts of one’s own—it is possible to perform various identities before audiences 
sharing similar contexts of concern and interpretation, while minimizing the visibility of 
those disparate self-performances through distribution into various networks constructed by 
and around others. 
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This is no real solution to privacy concerns—if the user’s privacy settings are open to the 
public or to friends of friends, discussions on friends’ walls will be accessible to other 
friends, and we are, furthermore, quite unlikely to know the privacy settings of our friends—
but our intention here is to investigate strategies of self-presentation, not methods of locking 
down informational access. As a strategy for self-presentation and identity-construction, 
distributed identity allows for contextual communication, avoiding both untidiness and the 
construction of a unified identity by at least attempting to decline to participate in wider and 
perhaps more contentious forms of social interaction.  
 
6.4 IV. Minimized Identity 
 
This is a strategy of interaction, also reactive rather than proactive, but unitary in 
presentation, in which the user makes no active attempt at unitary self-performance, but 
instead maintains a unitary self-presentation through filtering of viewable content, creating a 
locked-down representation of self. This minimization may be accomplished by selective 
untagging and choosing not to post or upload pictures, sometimes refusing to post even a 
profile picture. By choosing to avoid self-presentation altogether, speaking only when spoken 
to, so to speak, a user may avoid a positive construction of self on SNS, maintaining only a 
placeholder onto which their friends may project the image of the user presented elsewhere 
online or offline.  
 
It may be that the user makes us of SNS privately and only when and as necessary—
responding to the obligation to participate by setting up a minimal profile and visiting only 
when notified of friend requests, messages, or wall postings—but this may not be the case: 
this minimized strategy of identity construction is actually compatible with a fair amount of 
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regular SNS use. It may be that the user feels no impulse to perform the self, or to share with 
or respond to friends, but still chooses to be a silent audience to their communications. It may 
be that the user, out of discomfort with the other compromises above, chooses to respond to 
SNS communications offline, or through chat or private message, rather than constructing an 
SNS identity. Regardless, a minimized strategy of identity construction does not necessarily 
imply a lessened amount of time spent on SNS, but only a lessened engagement with others 
through the SNS itself. 
 
In some sense, the minimized strategy of identity construction is a form of dramauthentic 
identity that attempts to opt out of performing a dramauthentic identity at all. SNS are viewed 
as a source of information rather than interaction, and self-performance is engaged in only in 
the more familiar or less dangerous spaces of offline communication, through one-on-one 
electronic communications, or in online spaces, like webforums, that grant users greater 
architectures of context control. 
 
 
7. Concluding Comments and Directions for Future Research 
 
Through these three kinds of SNS exposure (mixed, agonistic, and lowest-common-
denominator) and these four kinds of identity (spectacular, untidy, distributed, and 
minimized), we see a great variety of ways of performing dramauthentic identity, suitable to 
the great variety of kinds of social circumstances we find ourselves within, and the great 
variety of psychological, emotional, and social dispositions which influence identity 
management in circumstances, like those on SNS, where managing personal identity 
represents an unending succession of uncertain and imperfect compromises between our 
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various roles, relationships, and responsibilities. This detailed investigation of conditions, 
limits, and strategies of post-Facebook navigation of identity in community has hopefully 
made clear why I began by claiming that the problematic relationship between the online and 
offline selves has been deproblematicized in a problematic manner: the question of whether 
the online self is a true representation of the offline self has been resolved—but it has been 
resolved by tying the online self to the variety of offline selves in a way that requires a 
stability and unity of the online self which no longer represents, but instead constricts the 
offline self, and, furthermore, produces ever more blurring between offline and online self-
presentations. I hope, also, that another of my initial claims will now be no longer suggestive 
and obscure, but quite clear and concrete: in the current moment in technologically-enmeshed 
identity, the strikingly voluntary construction of self-narrative of earlier online self-identity 
has been re-attached to less-voluntary and involuntary aspects of offline life, collapsing the 
wild and limitless freedom of identity-construction partially back into the familiar and 
everyday dramaturgical self-construction of multiple self-presentations to various constituent 
communities—but now with an in some ways far greater architecturally-imposed need to 
reconcile those selves with one another, due to the promiscuous intermixing of communities 
in the information feeds of our Facebooked sociality. The online self is no longer a reflection 
of or departure from the offline self, or at least not merely so, but is instead a space in which 
offline and online selves are called to account for their diversity, sublating these public, 
private, and contextual online and offline performances in a way requiring a new kind of self-
performance within the collapsed contexts of our constitutive communities. 
 
While this investigation has been quite lengthy, it should be noted that it is nevertheless still 
quite incomplete. I hope that it shall prove of use to those seeking a model and a theoretical 
framework to support more specific, applied, and concrete research on particular aspects and 
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dynamics of identity performance on SNS, but I also hope that it will provoke theoretical 
critique and expansion. A specifically feminist or queer-theoretic perspective on the topic 
would, I am confident, identify important and quite general aspects of identity performance 
on SNS that I have either failed to give proper weight and consideration to, or have failed to 
even notice and outline. Similarly, Marxist or post-Marxist perspectives will discover 
important constraints and dynamics which do not appear in this account, but which are also 
necessary for this theory to be synoptic and well-founded. Consideration of kinds of social 
capital construction could helpfully expand this model by considering strategies directed 
towards either bonding or bridging social capital (Aldridge et al., 2002) and either cognitive 
or structural social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000)—or simply by looking into 
whether different user strategies are more, less, or in some way variously or simultaneously 
directed towards pursuing and maintaining either strong or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). 
Considerations of regional or national cultures of SNS use would certainly be revealing and 
valuable enrichments of the model—we might note, for example, that Gil de Zúñiga and 
Valenzuela (2010) found that in the United States “women, African Americans, and 
Hispanics use social networks more heavily than men and non-Hispanic whites” (p. xxxiv), 
which may well be accompanied by different cultures and strategies of use among these 
various demographics. I am also aware of some scholarship currently underway which could 
add valuable considerations of generational dynamics in strategies of exposure and identity 
construction—for example, provisional findings from Vittadini (2013) show that the “privacy 
culture” of older generations tends to begin from a perception of SNSs as public spaces, 
leading to a tendency towards what I have called a “lowest common denominator” strategy of 
exposure, while younger generations have a “privacy culture” more in keeping with a 
variable “contextual integrity” (Nissenbaum, 2004), tending towards what I have called a 
“mixed” strategy of exposure, and perhaps even what I’ve called a strategy of “distributed 
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identity construction.” These generational considerations promise to offer a great deal toward 
a fuller, more substantial, and more robust realization of a theory of identity performance on 
SNS. 
 
I hope that, in this way, this articulation of a basic model of “dramauthentic identity” can 
serve as perhaps a skeleton, or at least a spur, for the formation of a full, well-rounded, and 





1 As Paasonen (2002) pointed out, even long prior to the era of SNS, when we look at actual 
behavior—with the MOOs and MUDs that Turkle well-addressed as clear exceptions—a 
great many common and everyday uses of the internet do and did not push online identity too 
far afield from offline identity, for example, “[h]ome page practices are less about fantasies 
of transgressing one’s corporeality and social location, than about manifesting one’s presence 
online” (p. 30).  
 
2 As Hongladarom (2011) notes, “[c]ontrary to the received view that Facebook and Twitter 
tend to reflect the true identity and personality of the users (since according to the view users 
tend to be more revealing of their personal information), in the Thai context at least the 
characteristics of the earlier anonymous online discussion tends to carry over onto social 
networking sites, though in a visibly different form” (p. 537). The common use of personally-
unidentifiable images as profile pictures and of pseudonyms rather than real names, in the 
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Thai context, is due in part to limits on freedom of speech—but, certainly, this behavior, 
though more widespread in the Thai context, is seen elsewhere as well. 
 
3 Although only insofar as those norms and code enter into the phenomenology of the user. 
There is a different story to be told from the back end, and an interesting one: for a nice 
discussion of “algorithmic friendship,” the socio-technical hybrid social environment fostered 
by Facebook’s hidden EdgeRank and GraphRank algorithms, see Bucher (2012). 
 
4 Although this is becoming more difficult, as Google makes it increasingly difficult to refuse 
to tie YouTube accounts from real-name Google+ profiles. 
 
5 In less commonplace examples, such as the much-maligned furry community, we may be 
skeptical that self-presentation is the proper term for interacting with others as e.g. an 
anthropomorphized squirrel, or that the “true self” of a reclusive thirty-something woman 
might be a homosexual male were-tiger. Even were we to insist upon the term “self-
construction” rather than “self-presentation” in these cases, it is clear that those who engage 
in these interactions find them to be meaningful, and the impossibility of integrating these 
constructed selves with the other selves presented in other contexts more clearly limited by 
the facts of physical reality does not present any immediate reason why these fantastical self-
identities should be discarded out of hand as illusory. 
 
6 Searches by name or zip code can in fact be done at the U.S. national sex offender registry 
(http://www.nsopw.gov/); another governmental site (http://www.familywatchdog.us/) also 
places results on a Google map, with a color code and further information available by 
clicking on each address. 
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7 Jodi Dean (2010) has noted another rather different connection with authenticity endemic 
but applicable to blogs as well as SNS:  
 
More significant is the performance of authenticity enabled by 
Twitter—along with Facebook’s newsfeed and the mood 
updates on MySpace: the short glimpses into someone’s life as 
it is being lived seem real. The seem real in part because they 
are only glimpses, fragments, and indications rather than fully 
formed and composed reflections and in part because we 
witness them being seen by others. (p. 36) 
 
8 Although the way that this connection with Debord is being used here is somewhat different 
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